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Abstract 
Here is described  a preliminary method that enables secure “anti-search-engine” encryption, 
where the middleman can participate in the encrypted information exchange, without being 
able to understand the exchanged information, encrypted using a one-way function, as well as 
being unaware of one of two main exchange participants. 
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The Peacock Encryption (PE) method starts from the assumption of a possibility of encryption 
through a one-way function.  This assumption is critical, and implies the use of cryptographic 
(collision-free) hash functions, such as hash – based identity verification [Lubbe, 1998], when a 
user-inserted plaintext password is hashed, and compared with the stored hashed password. As 
seen in Figure 1, Adam and Eve both use the same keyword, which they encrypt with the same 
algorithm and one-way key, taken from a trusted third party (TTP).  Adam then tasks the 
middleman to search for this same encrypted keyword, and as now the middleman is unable to 
decipher the meaning of the encryption, he will be able to find Eve’s encrypted keyword, but 
not the keyword itself, and has points Adam to it.  
Another important aspect of this method is the masking of one of the two exchange 
participants. This is essential, because if the middleman is aware of Adam seeking Eve, he has a 
clear route for a keyword oracle. In order to prevent this, a second enciphered message will be 
attached to the first one-way keyword encipher (again see Figure 1).  The second enciphered 
message contains pointing address to Eve (Eve’s name), and is encrypted in with an 
independent, reversible encryption algorithm.  The deciphering key to this second encipher is 
then the initial keyword, which both Adam and Eve one-way enciphered, in order to disguise it 
from the searching middleman. As Adam is pointed to this “feather”, he will be able to acquire 
the second encrypted package, decipher it, and read the correct pointing address. In addition to 
adding a pointing address to the peacock feather, the two encrypted pieces of information 
should not be in the possession of Eve in the first place, which would trivialize the encryption of 
the pointing address. Instead, Eve (and anyone else) should place the feather in a special search 
site, so as to avoid direct detection by the middleman. Indeed, this search site need (and 
should) not have anything else in it, besides the keyword feathers. 
 Figure 1: A visual depiction of the exchange protocol. 
This way the PE-method is possible, but it has a considerable weakness, which require more 
elaboration. Obviously, even if secure encryption through a one-way function were possible, 
which is widely believed not to be the case [Wenbo, 2003], the middleman himself could use 
this same method to feed in enough keywords, as to be able to ‘map’ the encrypted feathers 
and their pointing addresses. For this reason, the TTP should change the encryption key often 
enough so as to make mapping or deciphering attempts impractical. This would involve regular 
checking with the TTP by Adam and Eve, but the information flow would be strictly one-way 
only – i.e. the TTP will simply announce it publicly, and method users would subsequently copy 
it down.  
This way the middleman, with potentially large computational resources, is included in the 
search-process without having a possibility of knowing who is searching, and for what. 
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